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ABSTRACT
Smart contract (SC) platforms form blocks of transactions into a chain and execute them via user-
defined smart contracts. In conventional platforms like Bitcoin and Ethereum, the transactions within
a block are executed sequentially by the miner and are then validated sequentially by the validators
to reach consensus about the final state of the block.
In order to leverage the advances of multicores, this paper explores the next generation of smart
contract platforms that enables concurrent execution of such contracts. Reasoning about the validity
of the object states is challenging in concurrent smart contracts. We examine a programming model
to support optimistic execution of SCTs. We introduce a novel programming language, so-called
OV, and a Solidity API to ease programing of optimistic smart contracts. OV language together
with static checking will help reasoning about a crucial property of optimistically executed smart
contracts – the validity of object states in trustless systems.
Keywords Smart contracts · Programming Model · Design-by-Contract · OV language · Object Validity · Validity
Contract · Optimistic · Static Checking · Trustless System · Distributed Ledger
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1 Introduction
Engineering softwares in legacy computer systems is challenging, especially to maintain systems’s properties in the
existence of concurrent calls that mutate system’s objects [32, 22, 9, 24]. It is even more challenging to write smart
contracts (SC) to be deployed on top of blockchains due to the nature of trustless environment.
As blockchain technologies and cryptographic algorithms have been more efficient and secure, smart contracts have
become increasingly popular. There have been many types of smart contracts since the term was first introduced [39].
Billions worth of USD are controlled by smart contracts world-wide, which are written in a number of programming
languages to suite specific use cases of such programs. Blockchains rely on a consensusmechanism to reach agreement
with peers on the sequential order of transactions in a block. Finalized transactions are committed as a group to the
distributed ledger. All peers on the network perform a validation step by re-executing the transactions within the block
and checking that the initial and final states match.
Ensuring correctness of smart contracts is a critical security concern as there have been exploitations of subtle bugs in
these programs in the past couple of years. Another challenge is that SC code’s immutability after deployment makes
bug fixing impossible. Current audit practices of smart contracts involve checking whether the code is safe against two
kinds of vulnerabilities: (i) generic security errors such as reentrancy and overflows, and (ii) deeper custom functional
requirements; for example, ”the sum of the deposits never exceeds the contract’s balance”. There have been a number
of security tools for discovering generic errors and a few automatic verifiers of deeper functional requirements [31].
In this paper, we consider smart contracts that are executed on blockchain-based platforms. We leverage the common
concept of the object invariants (i.e., functional requirements of objects) to address the challenge of expressing and
reasoning about object invariants in smart contracts. Prior to describing our approach to allowing object validity of
smart contracts to be specified and verified, we first highlight the importance of object validity in software development
and then an overview of smart contracts.
1.1 Validity and Program Reasoning
A popular approach to enginering softwares is to model softwares with real-world objects or concepts that show
clear program structures. Objects are often required to satisfy certain conditions — object invariants that must be
maintained to guarantee the expected behaviour of the system. Any violation of the object invariant is often undesirable
as it violates program logic and can cause programs to crash [19, 20, 29]. Here, this paper is not strictly limited to
object-oriented programming, though we assume such O-O practices as much as possible.
Generally, reasoning about and maintaining object invariants in concurrent programs is difficult. The difficulties come
from arbitrary object aliases, mutable object state, methods’ side effects and the sophisticated mixture of multiple
threads and shared mutable state typically of concurrent O-O programs.
class Account {
private int amount = 0;
// inv : amount >=0
int balance () {
return amount;
}
void deposit ( int x) {
amount += x;
}
void withdraw(int x) {
amount −= x;
}
}
class Customer {
private Account a;
private String id ;
// inv : a!= null && a.amount >= 10
void transfer ( int amt, String custID) {
Customer b = ....; // lookup custID
a.withdraw(amt);
b. deposit (amt);
}
Account getAccount() {
return a;
}
}
Listing 1: An example of Customer and Account written
in Java
Listing 1 shows an example showing the challenges for maintaining object validity. A bank customer has an account.
If a reference of account a of the customer is leaked, such as via a call getAccount(), then any manipulation of the
reference is out-of-control of the customer. The alias makes it very hard to reason about the invariant of the customer,
which depends on the account. If such a manipulation, e.g. withdraw, on the leaked reference occurs concurrently
with the client’s operation, it would lead to a race condition on the account. As a result, no matter how carefully the
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Customer code is synchronized, neither a consistent state of the account nor the customer’s invariant is guaranteed.
Even worse, now suppose all the three operations of the account are manifested with lock-based synchronization
(monitors or mutexes), to prevent the potential race condition. Unfortunately, deadlock can occur if two customers
attempt to simultanously transfer money to each other.
To mitigate the problems of locks, Software Transactional Memory (STM) systems [35] leverage a non-blocking ap-
proach promising to ease programming tasks for concurrent application developers. STM hides the complexity of
concurrency control from programmers and enables safe composition of scalable applications. STM offers a program-
ming model inspired from the ACID properties (e.g. Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation and Durability) of database
transactions which play a major role in software systems. There are, however, few STMs [13] paying attention to data
invariants — the consistency guarantees.
For code deployed in trustless systems, it is even a harder problem to reason about validity of objects. Concurrent
smart contracts are much more challenging to reason about, since execution is done via blockchain nodes in a trustless
system.
1.2 An Overview of Smart Contracts
Smart contract (SC), which was first proposed by Nick Szabo 20 years ago [39], refers to computer code that automat-
ically executes all or parts of an agreement and is stored on a blockchain-based platform. Smart contracts (SCs) are
supplied as user-defined scripts to be executed on blockchain nodes. The SC code is replicated across multiple nodes
of a blockchain and, therefore, benefits from the security, persistence and immutability that a blockchain offers. That
replication also means that as each new block is added to the blockchain, the code is, in effect, executed. With recent
blockchain technologies, smart contracts can handle more sophisticated transactions, with an increasing number of
on-chain tokenized assets. Developers may compose multiple transaction steps to form more complex smart contracts.
Bitcoin Script is the first successful implementation of a blockchain-based smart contract, providing a purposely not-
Turing-complete language with a set of simple, pre-defined commands. It allows a simple forms of SC for Bitcoin
transactions, such as pay-to-public-key-hash (P2PKH) and pay-to-script-hash (P2SH). Recently, other platforms, such
as Ethereum, can support more complex contractual functionalities and flexibilities. Solidity, which is a Turing-
complete language for smart contracts developed by Ethereum, is one of the most popular languages for SCs. Newer
blockchain platforms, such as Hyperledger Fabric [1], allow smart contracts to be written in various high-level lan-
guages.
Conventional smart contract plaforms, such as Ethereum, leverage the sequential execution model of transactions
within a block. The platforms have enabled the execution of transactions of various complexity in blocks via user-
defined smart contracts. Each block of the chain consists of multiple smart contract transactions (SCTs). These SCTs
are executed sequentially by the miner before appending the block into the miner’s blockchain. The remaining peers,
acting as validators, on receiving this block will again sequentially re-execute the SCTs of the block. The validators
agree with the miner about the final state of the block on their records. After validated, the block is added to the
blockchain.
There has been some research work studying concurrent execution of transactions in a block. For example, one such
approach is based on object semantics by miner using STM [2]. Concurrent miner stores a BlockGraph (BG) structure,
which captures the object-conflicts relations among the SCTs, inside the block. Validators re-execute the same SCTs
concurrently and deterministically, using the BG given by miner. The proposed block is appended into the blockchain
if successful validation, or discarded otherwise. To address the double-spending issue, Optimistic Validator uses
counter to find any malicious block proposed by a malicious miner [21]. Using concurrent miners and validators can
achieve better performance than existing SC frameworks.
1.3 Our Approach
Adding concurrency to the execution of SCTs can potentially help achieve better efficiency and higher throughput [2,
8, 41]. Yet, there is no research in reasoning about object validity and security issues such reentrancy, in SCs on these
platforms. In this paper, we are interested in the next generation of smart contracts platforms that can execute the SCTs
concurrently to harness the power of multi-core processors. In order to address the security concern, we introduce a
new approach that allows developers to specify validatity contracts in smart contracts. Valitidy contracts are used to
statically checked against any violation of contract as well as reentrancy issues.
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1.3.1 Solidity API for Validity Contract Specifications
There has been an extensive research in smart contracts tools and frameworks. But there is no research in how to
specify object’s validity in smart contracts. With Solidity, which is the most popular programming language for
writing smart contracts, there is still a lack of a way to specify object’s invarants [36].
To address this challenge, this paper introduces a new approach to allow programmers to specifying object’s invarants
into Solidity programs. The new Validity API uses invariants for validity guarantees of objects in SCs.
// file : storage . sol
pragma solidity >=0.5.16 <0.7.0;
/∗∗
∗ @title Storage
∗ @dev Store & retrieve value in a variable
∗/
contract Storage {
uint256 number;
/∗∗
∗ @dev Store value in variable
∗ @param num value to store
∗/
function store (uint256 num) public {
number = num;
}
/∗∗
∗ @dev Return value
∗ @return value of ’number’
∗/
function retrieve ()
public view returns (uint256){
return number;
}
}
Listing 2: An Storage contract in Solidity
// file : storage .ov
class Storage [o] {
uint256 number;
// inv : number > 0
public void store (uint256 num) <this, this> {
number = num;
}
public uint256 retrieve () <this , top> {
return number;
}
}
Listing 3: An Storage contract in OV
// file : storage ov . sol
pragma solidity >=0.5.16 <0.7.0;
import ’ ../ Ownable.sol’ ;
import ’ ../ Validity . sol ’ ;
/∗∗
∗ @title Storage
∗ @dev Store & retrieve value in a variable
∗/
contract Storage OV is Ownable, Validity {
uint256 number;
/∗∗
∗ @dev Store value in variable
∗ @param num value to store
∗/
function store (uint256 num)
preValid () postValid () public {
number = num;
}
/∗∗
∗ @dev Return value
∗ @return value of ’number’
∗/
function retrieve () preValid ()
public view returns (uint256) {
return number;
}
/∗∗
∗ @dev Return bool
∗ @return true if the invariant holds ; false otherwise
∗/
function isValid ()
external view returns (bool) {
return number > 0;
}
}
Listing 4: An Storage contract converted from OV to So-
lidity. Storage’s invariant is given in isValid(). Checking
functions thisThis(), thisTop(), or botThis() are appended
as function modifiers
In Listing 4, methods are appended with a method isValid() that specifies the invariant of Storage contract. Method
store is appended with new modifiers preValid() and postValid() to check pre-condition and post-condition. Func-
tion retrieve() has a precondition checked by appended modifier preValid().
Although the discussions are in Solidity, it is worth-mentioning that the concept of our work is not restricted to Solidity;
it can be extended to support other SC languages.
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1.3.2 Validity-Based Programming Language
We introduce a novel language, called OV (Optimistic valididy or Object validity), to help reason about the consistency
in concurrent SC applications. Validity contracts for methods and transactions specify assumptions and effects on
object invariants. The new language enables modular reasoning about object validity in the code and ensuring the
validity of objects at runtime.
The contract-based programming model in the form of pre- and post- checks provides the system the consistency re-
quired for ACID transactions. All complex details of the underlying execution mechanisms (e.g., locks or transactions;
the implementation details of STM library) are hidden from the programmers. With validity contract, OV system can
reduce the number of required validity checks compared to what other approaches would require if they attempted to
perform similar checks. Furthermore, validity contracts open a number of opportunities for optimization.
Listing 3 shows an example of Storage contract written in newOV language. Storage contract has an owner (”[o]”) that
is uniquely idenfitied at compile time and at runtime. Method store requires the Storage to be valid (first ”this”) and
it can invalidate the Store’s invariant inside its body (second ”this”). Assertions of Storage’s validity at the beginning
and the end is required for the store method. Method retrieve requires the Storage’s invariant, but does not modify
the state of Storage and so it invalidates nothing (pseudo ”top”). By using the validity contracts (”<this,this>” and
”<this,top>”), static checks can get rid of illegal operations.
Listing 5 gives a code fragment of a Ballot contract writing in Solidity. Listing 6 expresses the concept of Ballot con-
tract’s owner (”[o]”) and validity contract (”<this,this>”). The validity contract specifies that method vote requires
the Ballot contract is valid (and so all of its owned contracts are valid). The validity contract also states that the method
vote may make some modifications to the ballot’s state,
contract Ballot {
mapping(address => Voter) public voters;
// more state definitions
function vote(uint proposal) {
Voter sender = voters[msg.sender];
if (sender.voted)
throw;
sender.voted = true;
sender.vote = proposal;
proposals[proposal].voteCount += sender.weight;
}
// more operation definitions
}
Listing 5: A Ballot contract in Solidity
class Ballot [o] {
public map<this> voters; // address => Voter
// more state definitions
void vote(uint proposal)<this, this> {
Voter sender = voters.get(msg.sender);
if (sender.voted)
throw;
sender.voted = true;
sender.vote = proposal;
proposals[proposal].voteCount += sender.weight;
}
// more operation definitions
}
Listing 6: A Ballot contract in OV
The benefits of validity contracts are three-fold. First, validity contracts are served for detecting transactional conflicts
at a higher abstraction level (e.g., validity interference) than reads and writes. In STM, conflict detection determines
when two transactions cannot both safely commit, to guarantee serializability. Second, validity contracts can be
used for conflict resolution in contention management to guarantee progress (livelock avoidance) [16, 15], to increase
throughput dramatically in high contention workloads [10, 33]. With validity contracts, contract-based contention
managers with different safety-driven strategies can be developed to ensure liveness. Third, validity checks can be
deduced from contracts and scheduled at transaction commits to preserve object validity. Reentrancy issues can
be avoided from enforcing the validity requirements and effects of operations inside a transaction’s body. Validity
contracts can help reduce the number of validity checks while ensuring safety. The validity contracts can be used
to insert correct assertions of validity, e.g., calling preValid(), postValid() from the Validity API. Transactional
validation ensures a transaction never views or makes use of inconsistent data; while object revalidation ensures
transactions only commit valid data.
1.4 Contributions
This paper makes the following contributions:
− Validity API We present a new API that provides a feasible solution to allow developers to specify object
validity in smart contracts written in Solidity.
− New Programming Model for Validity Contracts: This paper proposes a general programming model to
allow developers to specify validity contracts for smart contracts. The validity contracts ensure sufficient
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checks for validity requirement at a function call start. The validity contracts are useful for detecting and
scheduling conflicting transactions, and for software assurance by automating object revalidation via deduced
assertions.
− Reasoning about Optimistic Smart Contracts: This work is the first that introduces a practical way to
express validity contracts in smart contracts. We present a new language OV integrating ownership mecha-
nism, type system and dynamic semantics for modular reasoning about object validity and validity contracts
for smart contract transactions. The validity contracts are useful to enhance program safety and to improve
modularity and composability of optimistic smart contracts.
1.5 Paper structure
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces our new Validity API written in Solidity and an
example of validity contracts using our API. Section 3 presents our validity-aware model and new OV language for
optimistic smart contracts. The section gives the execution model, abstract syntax and semantics of the new language.
Section 4 gives some discussions about possible optimization using validatity contracts. Section 5 gives an overview
of the related work. Section 6 concludes.
2 New Solidity API for Validity Contracts
To overcome the shortcomings of Solidity, we introduce a new Validity API to allow developers to specify and reason
about object validity.
2.1 Validity API
Ownable contract describes a general kind of contracts that has an owner. There is a private field ’owner’ that will be
initiated at contract creation; caller that creates a contract is the owner of the created contract. Modifier isOwner is used
in functions whose invocation is restrictive to the contract’s owner. Modifier isCalledBy is dedicated for functions
that are called from a particular caller’s address.
// file : ownable.sol
pragma solidity >=0.5.16 <0.7.0;
/∗∗
∗ @title Ownable
∗ @dev Set and get owner
∗/
contract Ownable
// modifier to check if caller is owner
modifier isOwner() {
require (msg.sender == owner, ”Caller is not owner”);
;
}
// modifier to check if caller is owner
modifier isCalledBy( address addr) {
require (msg.sender == addr , ”Caller is not the specified address” );
;
}
// @dev Set contract deployer as owner
constructor () public {
owner = msg.sender; // ’msg.sender’ is sender of current call
}
/∗∗
∗ @dev Return owner address
∗ @return address of owner
∗/
function getOwner() external view returns ( address ) {
return owner;
}
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address private owner;
}
Listing 7: An Ownable contract in Solidity
In this API, ownership transfer is not allowed. Each contract has a unique immutable owner at creation time. This is
to guarantee the ownership tree (which-owns-which) is unique to ease the reasoning of validity of SCs.
Validity interface gives a simple interface that defines isValid() function and two modifiers. Actual contracts that
implement Validity interface must specify its own implementation of isValid() function. Modifier preValid() is
used for a function that require the contract’s validity before the function’s invocation. Whereas modifier preValid()
asserts a post-condition of the contract’s validity after the function is called.
// file : validity .ov
pragma solidity >=0.5.16 <0.7.0;
/∗∗
∗ @title Validity
∗ @dev define validity of an object
∗/
interface Validity {
/∗∗
∗ The invariant condition of an object .
∗ Subclass must implement this method speciyfing its invariant .
∗/
function isValid () external view returns (bool );
// modifier to check object ’s validity prior a function call
modifier preValid () {
require ( this . isValid (), ” Validity fails pre−check”);
;
}
// modifier to check object ’s validity immediately after a function call
modifier postValid () {
;
require ( this . isValid (), ” Validity fails post−check”);
}
}
Listing 8: An Storage contract in OV
OVValidity interface extends Validity interface by adding several extra modifiers. These additional modifiers are used
to ease the transformation of OV program into Solidity. Modifier thisThis() is used for functions that require pre-
and post- checks of a contract’s validity. This corresponds to the contract <this,this> in OV. Modifier botThis()
is used for functions that require a post- check of a contract’s validity. This corresponds to the contract <bot,this>
in OV. Modifier thisTop() is used for functions that require a pre- check of a contract’s validity. This corresponds to
the contract <this,top> in OV. Modifier botTop() is used for functions that neither require a pre- or post- check of a
contract’s validity. This corresponds to the contract <bot,top> in OV. This modifier can be safely ignored, as functions
with this validity contract does not require such checks.
// file : ovvalidity . sol
pragma solidity >=0.5.16 <0.7.0;
/∗∗
∗ @title OVValidity
∗ @dev define validity of an object
∗/
interface OVValidity {
/∗∗
∗ The invariant condition of an object .
∗ Subclass must implement this method speciyfing its invariant .
∗/
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function isValid () external view returns (bool );
// modifier to check object ’s validity prior a function call
modifier preValid () {
require ( this . isValid (), ” Validity fails pre−check”);
;
}
// modifier to object ’s validity immediately after a function call
modifier postValid () {
;
require ( this . isValid (), ” Validity fails post−check”);
}
// The following modifiers are short−hand for OV language
// modifier to check object ’s validity before and after a function call
modifier thisThis () {
require ( this . isValid (), ” Validity fails pre−check”);
;
require ( this . isValid (), ” Validity fails post−check”);
}
// modifier to check object ’s validity after a function call
modifier botThis () {
;
require ( this . isValid (), ” Validity fails post−check”);
}
// modifier to check object ’s validity before a function call
modifier thisTop () {
require ( this . isValid (), ” Validity fails pre−check”);
;
}
// modifier that is simply not checking object ’s validity at all
modifier botTop() {
;
}
}
Listing 9: An OVValidity interface specifying validity function isValid() and modifiers thisThis(), thisTop(), or bot-
This() are appended as function modifiers
2.2 Example
We then present an example of smart contracts using our Validity API. Listing 10 shows an Account contract writing
in Solidity. An Account contract has a balance and three functions. The account balance has an invariant that requires
the balance is greater than 0 and less than 1e30. Functions deposit and withdraw can modify the balance field and thus
can invalidate the account’s invariant. Function get simply retrieves the value of the balance.
Listing 11 shows the Account contract written in OV language. The account has an owner (”[o]”). Functions
deposit() and withdraw() require the account’s invariant to be valid before and after the function’s body. In OV,
the validity contracts are specified as <this,this>. Function get() retrieves the balance without any modification to
the account’s state (the balance field). Validity contract specified in OV as <this,top>.
Listing 12 gives a program, which is the result of a transformation from OV to Solidity. The account contract imple-
ments Ownerable contract and OVValidity interface. The object validity is defined in isValid function. The isValid
function itself does not require any validity checks and thus botThis() modifier is used. Functions deposit() and
withdraw() are appended with modifier thisThis(). Function get is appended with modifier thisTop().
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pragma solidity >=0.5.16 <0.7.0;
/∗∗
∗ @title Account
∗ @dev Deposit, withdraw and get balance
∗/
contract Account {
uint256 balance ;
// invariant : balance > 0 && balance < 1e30
/∗∗
∗ @dev Deposit an amount to the account
∗ @param amount value to deposit
∗/
function deposit (uint256 amount) public {
balance += amount;
}
/∗∗
∗ @dev Withdraw an amount from the account
∗ @param amount value to withdraw
∗/
function withdraw(uint256 amount) public {
balance −= amount;
}
/∗∗
∗ @dev Return value
∗ @return value of the account
∗/
function get () public view returns (uint256){
return balance ;
}
}
Listing 10: An Account contract in Solidity
class Account [o] {
uint256 balance ;
// inv : balance > 0 && balance < 1e30
public void deposit (uint256 balance)<this , this> {
balance += amount;
}
public void withdraw(uint256 balance)<this , this> {
balance −= amount;
}
public uint256 get()< this , top> {
return balance ;
}
}
Listing 11: An Account contract in OV
pragma solidity >=0.5.16 <0.7.0;
import ’ ../ Ownable.sol’ ;
import ’ ../ OVValidity. sol ’ ;
/∗∗
∗ @title Account
∗ @dev Deposit, withdraw and get balance
∗/
contract Account is Ownable, OVValidity {
uint256 balance ;
// invariant : balance > 0 && balance < 1e30
/∗∗
∗ @dev Deposit an amount to the account
∗ @param amount value to deposit
∗/
function deposit (uint256 amount) thisThis () public {
balance += amount;
}
/∗∗
∗ @dev Withdraw an amount from the account
∗ @param amount value to withdraw
∗/
function withdraw(uint256 amount) thisThis () public {
balance −= amount;
}
/∗∗
∗ @dev Return value
∗ @return value of the account
∗/
function get () thisTop () public view returns (uint256){
return balance ;
}
/∗∗
∗ The invariant
∗ @dev Return bool
∗ @return true if the invariant holds ; false otherwise
∗/
function isValid () botThis ()
external view returns (bool) {
return balance > 0 && balance < 1e30;
}
}
Listing 12: An Account contract converted from OV to So-
lidity. Account’s invariant is given in isValid(). Checking
functions thisThis(), thisTop(), or botThis() are appended as
function modifiers
3 OV: Validity-Aware Optimistic Smart Contracts
We present our new programming model, in which transaction has a validity contract specifying the requirements and
effects. Transaction contracts are useful for program verification and optimization. Based on the design-by-contract
(DbC) discipline, transaction contracts can be used to ensure system validity by supporting both static or dynamic
checking, and can be used to help detect and resolve conflicts between transactions.
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3.1 Validity Contracts for Smart Contract Transactions
Transaction comprises a set of operations to be executed all at once, or none at all. Transactions often preserve the
ACI (atomicity, consistency, isolation) properties. A transaction may perform operations on shared objects, as well as
local data (objects) that are inaccessible to other transactions. Each transaction, distinguished by a unique identifier, is
initially live and may eventually become either committed (successful) or aborted (failed or cancelled).
Our new language, namelyOV, generalizes the idea of validity contracts and validity subcontracting that are introduced
in AVID [30] for contract specifications of STM transactions in legacy softwares. Specifying the validity contracts in
OV is similar to read-write effects in previous work [23, 6, 5, 4] for sequential programs. Here, OV leverages the idea
of validity contract to describe behavioural abstraction of a SC transaction.
Listing 13 describes the underlying mechanism of validity contracts for SC transactions. A validity contract of a SC
transaction, written as 〈V , I〉, specifies the validity requirements and effects of the transaction. The validity set V
specifies a set of objects that must be valid both before and after transaction execution. The invalidity set I specifies a
set of objects that may be invalidated by the execution of the transaction. These objects in I are the only ones whose
fields may be modified within the transaction’s execution. That means the invariant of the objects within V ∩ I may
be broken during the transaction execution. These objects must be revalidated prior to transaction commit; all objects
in the validity set are ensured valid once transaction commits.
Validity contract 〈V, I〉 of a transaction T implies:
Begin: requires V valid
Executing: may modify I
Prior to commit: revalidate V ∩ I
Finish: ensures V valid; I \ V may still be invalid
Listing 13: Meaning of Transaction’s Validity Contract
Validity subcontracting restricts which operations may be performed by a specific contract. Subcontracting constrains
the invariant requirements and effects of calls or subtransactions nested inside a transaction or a method, such as the
relationship between a caller and each of its callees, and between a transaction and each of its nested transactions.
That is, 〈V ′, I ′〉 is a subcontract of 〈V , I〉 if V ′ ⊆ V and I ′ ⊆ I. Like AVID, the version of subcontract in OV allows
more programs to be type checked, but requires additional runtime validity checks.
A context V in OV is a syntactic sugar for the set of objects in the subtree of the ownership tree rooted at V (as in
[23, 4]). Ownership contexts are used to specify both validity and invalidity sets. A bot context represents an empty
set. A transaction/call with bot validity set implies no validity check required at start. A bot invalidity set implies the
transaction/call neither modifies nor invalidates any object.
OV transactional executionmechanism allows roll back of a transaction that causes violation of some object’s invariant.
Pure queries having an empty I and so require no revalidation. The overlap of V ′ and V \ I specifies the set of
objects whose validity is required at the start of the (sub)transaction/call. No revalidation is necessary at the end of a
transaction when there is no overlap between V and I.
3.2 Execution Model
Execution model of OV programs allows a transaction to create a sub-transaction by using atomic{S} expression.
Semantics for contract-attached atomic expression in our model is similar to the one used in [16, 37, 7, 17]. OV
transaction may nest a number of sub-transactions. Here, we assume a simpler model, called linear nesting [28,
18], which restricts a transaction to have at most one live child. This simple form ensures atomicity of the nested
transactions and validity of the objects rather than full concurrency optimization. Top-level transactions can run
concurrently and commit their effects to the memory. Generally speaking, OV’s general execution model can support
closed nested transactions [27], in which all memory locations being accessed by nested transactions are conceptually
considered as being accessed by its parent transaction. When a closed-nested transaction commits, its read and write
sets are merged with those of its parent.
Validity requirement specifies how transactions can guarantee the validity at transaction start. A transaction may wait
for validity prior to transaction start and may revalidate validity of an object before it commits. For example, by using
conditional atomic regions [3, 7, 17] or conditional critical regions (CCR) [12]. The when(o.valid()){S} expression
waits until the object invariant being held before it starts the transaction execution.
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Transaction validation ensures the consistency of the objects accessed by a transaction, with respect to other concurrent
transactions. Retrying an aborted transaction is considered as executing a new transaction with same validity contracts,
although with a different transaction identifier. Object revalidation ensures the consistency of the objects according
to the contract of the particular transaction. In OV’s general model, transaction performs an automatic check for the
validity of the object in the transaction validation step. The validity check is deduciable from the transaction’s contract.
Validity subcontract generalises a similar concept in AVID [30] used only for concurrent programs, to apply for smart
contract transactions. For all method definitions, it guarantees all expressions inside a method are covered by the
method contract. For all transactions, subcontracting is applied to parent and child transaction, or to a transaction
and its nested calls/transactions. Parent transaction must ensure the validity set of a subtransaction’s contract before it
starts. The invalidity set of the subtransaction must be captured within that of its parent transaction.
3.3 Language
Here, we present our OV language, which is a Java-like language, for secure smart contracts. OV language is based on
AVID language [30], which was introduced for STM in legacy softwares. More details about the validity contracts,
type systems and semantics can be found in AVID [30].
The abstract syntax of OV language is shown in Table 1. The type system relies on ownership types for managing
dependencies between object invariants. The metavariables T ranges over types;K ranges over contexts; V, I ranges
over validity and invalidity sets ; P ranges over programs; L ranges over class definitions; M ranges over method
definitions; e ranges over expressions; C, X , m, f and x range over class, formal context parameters, method and
field names, and variables names, respectively. this refers to the target object for the current call and is also used as
an ownership context. The overbar is used for a possibly empty sequence of constructs; for example, e is used for
a finite ordered sequence e1..en, T x stands for a possibly empty sequence of pairs T1 x1..Tn xn. An expression
e can be either a constant c, a variable x, the this pseudo variable, a field access e.f , a method invocation e.m(e),
an object construction new T , a sequential composition (seq(e, e)), a thread creation (fork e) and an atomic block
(atomic[∆]opt e).
T ::= C〈K〉 | int | bool types
K ::= X | top | bot | this | ∗ contexts
V, I ::= K validity and invalidity sets
P ::= L e programs
L ::= class C[X ]⊳ T whereXRX
{[final]opt T f ; M} classes
R ::= ≺ |  constraints
M ::= T m(T x) ∆ {e} methods
∆ ::= 〈V, I〉 contracts
e ::= c | v | new T | x = e
| v.f | v.f = v | v.m(x)
| seq(e, e) | atomic [∆]opt e | fork e expressions
v ::= this | x values
C ::= id class names
X ::= id formal ownership parameter names
m ::= id method names
f ::= id field names
x ::= id variable names
Table 1: Abstract Syntax
In OV language, threads can only be created at top-level, not within a transaction, as in existing proposals including
[26]. The main constructs of the language are two constructs: atomic for transaction and fork for concurrency. Effect
clauses are used to name object sets as required for validity contracts. An OV atomic block has a validity contract that
is optionally specified, i.e., (atomic[∆]opt e) for executing e as a transaction. The optional contract ∆ is supplied to
an atomic expression in case the contract cannot be deduced, i.e., for a code block; whereas no explicit contract is
required in the case of a single expression e (such as a single assignment or method call). A transaction, with contract
〈this,this〉, must revalidate this object prior to commit. OV language does not provide explicit abort/retry construct,
although this construct are easily added as in prior work [11] with no evaluation rule for it.
Programs consist of a collection of classes with an expression e to be evaluated. Classes are parameterised with context
parameters having some constraints expressed by the where clause such as assumed ordering. The first formal context
parameter of a class determines the owner of this object within the class. Contexts can be formal class parameters;
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the current context this; the root top and the bottom bot of the ownership hierarchy. The actual owner of an object is
determined by its creation type, and is fixed for the lifetime of the object. For the sake of simplicity, the expression of
object invariants and their dependence on fields is not formalized. Instead, object’s invariant must only depend on its
own fields and on fields of other objects that it (transitively) owns.
As an example, Listing 14 shows the bank account contract example, which is written in OV abstract syntax. Owner-
ship types and validity contracts are highlighted in the example.
class Account[o] {
int amount = 0;
// inv : amount >= 0
Account(int amt) {
amount = amt;
}
int balance () <this , bot> {
return amount;
}
void deposit ( int x)<this , this>{
amount += x;
}
void withdraw( int x)<this , this>{
amount −= x;
}
}
class Customer {
Account<this> a = new Account<this>(0);
// inv : a != null && a.amount >= 10
void safeWithdraw( int amt)<this, this>{
verifyLogin ();
...
atomic a .withdraw(amt);
}
void verifyLogin()<bot, this>{
...
}
}
Listing 14: Account and Customer example in OV ab-
stract syntax
Transactions are created explicitly with atomic keyword. OV transactional framework will take as input the Java-
annotated programs and schedule the transactions. The specified validity contract 〈this,this〉 in the Account’s withdraw
method has two usages. First, it helps detect possible interference with transactions. Second, my system can deduce
that account a needs to be revalidated prior to committing the transaction. My transactional frameworkwill perform the
validity check by invoking a.valid. The transaction will commit if the check returns true; otherwise, the transaction
will be aborted and retried. This safety guarantee is the ultimate goal of my work.
3.4 Type System
This section gives most relevant rules of the OV language, including contract checking. The full type system is
included in [30]. Table 2 extends the abstract syntax with type environments for use in the type system. I define an
existential context ? to be included in contextK . I define a typing environment Γ as • | Γ, X | Γ, X R X | Γ, v : T .
The typing environment records context parameters, the assumed constraints between context parameters, and the
types of variables. Expression valid e is a validity assertion.
K ::= ... | ? contexts
e ::= ... | valid e expressions
Γ ::= • | Γ, X | Γ, X R X | Γ, v : T environments
Table 2: Extended Syntax for Type System
Table 3 defines well-formed contract and subcontract rules for enforcing validity subcontracting. The [CONTRACT-SUB]
rule specifies containment of contract requires both containment of validity requirements and invalidity effects. It
also highlights the fact that calls that affect the validity invariant can be only originated from the owner context. The
[EFFECT-SUB] states that sub-context implies sub-effect. Sub-effect is a transitive relation, specified by [EFFECT-TRA]
rule. The table also covers containment of context sets.
[CONTRACT]
Γ ⊢ V Γ ⊢ I
Γ ⊢ 〈V, I〉
[CONTRACT-SUB]
Γ ⊢ V ′ ⊑ V Γ ⊢ I ′ ⊑ I
Γ; 〈V, I〉 ⊢ 〈V ′, I ′〉
[EFFECT-SUB]
Γ ⊢ K  K′
Γ ⊢ K ⊑ K′
[EFFECT-TRA]
Γ ⊢ I ⊑ I ′ Γ ⊢ I ′ ⊑ I ′′
Γ ⊢ I ⊑ I ′′
Table 3: Rules for Validity Contract and Subcontract
Table 4 provides rules for type well-formedness, subtyping rules for expressible types and the rules for context ab-
straction. A separate judgement is introduced for bindability to handle types with existential contexts (which only
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occur in the type system after field or method lookup). For expressible types, there is no difference between subtyping
and bindability. [ABS-RFL] ensures that the existential contexts abstract nothing by insist they must be valid contexts.
Combined with [BIN-ABS] this ensures that bindability is not reflexive, because existential types can only occur on the
right-hand side of the binding relation. Through the use of bindability in typing field assignment and method argument
binding, this prevents existential contexts from being associated with the target of a binding.
[TYP-OBJ]
defin(C〈K〉, ) = class C ... whereK′ R K′′
Γ ⊢ K Γ ⊢ K′ R K′′
Γ ⊢o C〈K〉
[TYPE]
Γ ⊢o T
′
⊢ T ′ < T
Γ ⊢ T
[SUB-EXT]
class C[X] ⊳ T ′ ...
T = [K/X ]T ′
⊢ C〈K〉 < T
[SUB-RFL]
⊢ T < T
[SUB-TRA]
⊢ T < T ′
⊢ T ′ < T ′′
⊢ T < T ′′
[BIN-ABS]
⊢ K ≪ K′
⊢ C〈K〉 <: C〈K′〉
[BIN-SUB]
⊢ T < T ′′
⊢ T ′′ <: T ′
⊢ T <: T ′
[ABS-ANY]
⊢ K ≪ ∗
[ABS-RFL]
Γ ⊢ K
⊢ K ≪ K
Table 4: Rules for Type, Subtype, Binding and Abstraction
3.5 Dynamic Semantics and Properties
The operational semantics of OV type system based on AVID [30] are briefly presented here. OV’s transactional mem-
ory semantics is based on the semantics of AVID, which is built on top of Oval [23] and StrongBasic language [26].
Object validity can be ensured from validity contracts and the strong isolation of transactions.
Table 5 gives the extended syntax and features used by OV dynamic semantics. A program state has the form of
α;H ; Σ;S; Π where α indicates whether any thread is currently executing a transaction (a = ◦ for no and α = ⋆ for
yes),H is a heap, Σ is a set of valid objects in H , S is a stack frames of contracts, and Π is a collection of threads. A
heapH is a mapping from locations l to objects o; an object maps its fields f to locations l. All locations are annotated
with the type of the object they refer to; but we may omit them wherever that information is not used. Values are
extended with locations, thereby allowing locations to be used as ownership contexts. At runtime, new expression
inatomic(e) is used to present a partially completed transaction with remaining computation e. Let Π1‖ Π2 denote a
combination of two thread collections into a larger collection, where operator ‖ is commutative and associative.
l, lT typed locations
v ::= ... | l values
e ::= ... | inatomic(e) expressions
o ::= f 7→ l objects
H ::= l 7→ o heaps
Σ ::= bot, l valid objects
Π ::= • | Π ‖ e thread collections
S ::= ∆ stack frames
α ::= ◦ | ⋆ thread existence conditions
Table 5: Extended Syntax for Dynamic Semantics
Like AVID, OV’s semantics is based on StrongBasic language [26] and allows at most one thread to execute a transac-
tion at a time, as if all transactions were protected by a single global lock [25]. In this semantics, α acts like a global
lock where ⋆ indicates the lock is held, to enforce atomicity and isolation. Let • denote an empty entity, such as the
initial heap, thread collection and the type environment which is not available in the dynamic semantics. Unused • can
be omited, e.g., ⊢ e : T in place of • ⊢ e : T ; and e in place of • ‖ e. The source program L e contains only a single
e, but the evaluation of e can spawn new threads, which in turn can spawn new threads.
Ownership information and validity contracts are needed in static type checking, and may be erased after type check-
ing. They are only used in a specific implementation such as for conflict resolution. Thus, they do not affect how
expressions are evaluated; generally they can be erased once validity checks (valid e) are inserted into translated
program. However, to keep a connection between static and dynamic semantics, the dynamic semantics still include
ownership and contracts.
We now present some of the key properties of the OV’s type system. In this formalization, it is presumed that every
transaction with a contract 〈l,l〉 endingwith valid l to allow abort/retry (i.e., undo any write l′.f = ... whereΓ ⊢ l′  l)
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in the case when the check fails (*). Important lemmas are given as follows. The proofs of these lemmas are described
in AVID [30].
Lemma 3.1 (Progress) Given Γ ⊢ α;H ; Σ;S; Π, then either Π is all values or ∃α′;H ′; Σ′;S′; Π′ such that
α;H ; Σ;S; Π −→ α′;H ′; Σ′;S′; Π′.
Proof. If Π is all values, then no reduction rule applies. Otherwise, the proof proceeds by induction on the form of
α;H ; Σ;S; e −→ α′;H ′; Σ′;S′; e′; Π.
Lemma 3.2 (Type and Contract Preservation)
If
{
H ; Σ ⊢ ∆ and ⊢ H
•; ∆ ⊢ e : T
and α;H ; Σ;S; e −→ α′;H ′; Σ′;S′; e′; Π, then
{
H ′; Σ′ ⊢ ∆′ and ⊢ H ′
•; ∆′ ⊢ e′ : T and ⊢ T ′ <: T
where S = ...,∆ and S′ = ...,∆′.
Lemma 3.3 (System Validity Preservation) Given ⊢ L e and ◦; •; •;〈top,top〉; e −→ ◦;H ; Σ;S; v1 ‖ .. ‖ vn, then
Σ = dom(H).
4 Discussions
This section gives several discussions about our approach to object validity in optimistic smart contracts. Besides
static checking, validity contracts are useful for optimistic execution optimization.
Validity Interference Dection Validity contracts can be used for detecting transactional conflicts at a higher abstrac-
tion level (e.g., validity interference) than reads and writes. Validity interference occurs during a transaction’s lifetime
when validity assumptions may not hold. OV objects are structured hierarchically and may be accessed by all transac-
tions. Conflict detection determines when two transactions cannot both safely commit, to guarantee serializability.
A transaction may read any objects both inside and outside of the validity set, and may write to objects in the invalidity
set of the transaction’s contract. There are two cases that transaction interference can occur. The first case is when
one transaction presumes the validity of an object that another transaction may invalidate it. It means one transaction’s
invalidity set overlaps with another’s validity set. The second case is when the two invalidity sets overlap.
Transactions in different parts of the object ownership tree may safely execute concurrently. Two transactions whose
contracts are 〈V1, I1〉 and 〈V2, I2〉 do not interfere with each other if: (V1 ∩I2 = ∅)∧ (V2 ∩I1 = ∅)∧ (I1 ∩I2 = ∅).
ContentionManagement Validity contracts can be used for conflict resolution to ensure liveness. Contention man-
agement was originally proposed for conflict resolution to guarantee progress (livelock avoidance) in obstruction-free
STMs [16, 15]. Contention management can be tuned to increase throughput dramatically in high contention work-
loads [10, 33]. With validity contracts, contract-based contention managers can employ different safety-driven strate-
gies to ensure liveness and determined priority of a transaction. For two conflicting transactions, a transaction that is
less important or requires significant time for validation, is a more appropriate candidate for abortion.
Validity Check Optimization Validity checks can be deduced from contracts and scheduled at transaction commits
to preserve object validity. Validation step ensures a transaction never views or makes use of inconsistent data and
object revalidation guarantees that transactions only commit valid data. Validity checks should not contain any side
effects and I/O operations as in [13] and similarly in ours. Validity contracts and subcontracting can be used to reduce
the number of validity checks while ensuring safety.
In certain programming scenarios, we may ignore some transaction conflicts that are less relevant and may in fact be
harmless. That is, for an object being read by a transaction and written by another transaction, a read-write conflict is
considered harmless if for example, the read is not covered by the validity assumption (i.e., the transaction’s validity
set). For example, generating a booking id in a booking system may not require the validity of the whole system.
Another example is when a client requests for an approximation of the total number of successful transactions. As a
rule of thumbs, if programmers presume the validity of an object for such read access, the contract’s validity set must
be large enough to cover the read.
5 Related work
This section gives a brief overview of related work in blockchains, smart contracts, and the challenges in programming
reasoning.
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5.1 Blockchains and Smart Contracts
A blockchain is a distributed ledger maintained by peers of a network, all of which follow a consensus protocol. It
forms a cryptographic chain of blocks, which are replicated among the peers without a single centralized entity. State
variables are recorded on the blockchain. Transaction, if successful, may change the state of the ledger. A block may
contain from zero up to a finite number of transactions. Well known database transaction models such as ACID and
BASE are applicable to the blockchain [40].
The term smart contract (SC) was first coined by Nick Szabo in 20 years ago. A smart contract is comprised of
degitalized promises and protocols within which the parties perform on these promises. A known example of a smart
contract is a vending machine; if sufficient money is inserted into the machine, the machine automatically delivers the
snack. Smart contracts require specific input parameters and well-defined execution steps, in the form: if ‘x‘, then
execute ‘y‘. The actual tasks performed by SCs are deterministic and often trival, such as automatic transfer from one
wallet to another, when a certain condition is met. Latest SC platforms permit trivial to complex instruction sequences
in a transaction. SCs are issued to trustless system of possibly anonymous parties. If the parties initiate a transaction
indicating certain condition is met, the code will execute the triggered step. Each block of transactions is validated to
ensure a final consistent ordering. In case transaction is never initiated, the code will not execute.
Bitcoin Script is the first successful implementation of a blockchain-based smart contract. It is a purposely not-
Turing-complete language with a set of simple, pre-defined commands that supports simple forms of SC for Bitcoin
transactions. New platforms, such as Ethereum, can support more complex contracts. Solidity, which is a Turing-
complete language developed by Ethereum, is one of the most popular languages for SCs. Newer blockchain platforms,
such as Hyperledger Fabric [1], support smart contracts written in various high-level languages.
Conventional smart contract plaforms leverage the sequential execution model of transactions within a block. Each
block of the blockchain contains multiple smart contract transactions (SCTs). They are executed sequentially by the
miner before appending the block into the miner’s blockchain. On receiving the block, peers as validators will re-
execute sequentially the SCTs of the block. If the validators agree with the miner about the final state of the block on
their records, the block will be added to the blockchain.
There have been several research works that study concurrent execution of transactions in a block [2, 21]. One ap-
proach is based on object semantics by miner using STM [2]. Concurrent miner stores a BlockGraph (BG) structure,
capturing the object-conflict relations among the SCTs inside a block. Validators re-execute the same SCTs concur-
rently using the BG given by miner. There is another approach that introduced Optimistic Validator to address the
double-spending issue by using counter to find any malicious block proposed by a malicious miner [21]. In general,
SC transactions on accounts in a blockchain can be seen as threads using concurrent objects in shared memory [34].
A smart contract transaction can be viewed as a concurrent method, often with some semantic dependencies. When
a block commits multiple smart contract transactions simultaneously, it is similar to the way a transactional data
structure commits multiple concurrent methods in a single atomic step.
In this paper, we consider the next generation of smart contracts platforms that support concurrent execution of smart
contracts in a block. We address the main challenge to ensure the validity of objects in these concurrent smart contracts.
5.2 Program Reasoning
Object-oriented programming (OOP) provides basic concepts, such as encapsulation, inheritance and polymorphism,
to model softwares with objects showing a clear program structure. Decoupling the internal functioning of objects from
their external interface can make changes to the internal implementation a lot easier during upgrading or maintenance
without affecting the clients. Such practices also enable software reuse and composability.
Object invariants describe essential properties of objects that must be maintained to guarantee the expected behaviour
of the program execution. Any violation of the object invariant is often undesirable as it violates program logic and
can cause programs to crash. Yet reasoning about and maintaining object invariants in concurrent programs is difficult.
The difficulties come from arbitrary object aliases, mutable object state, methods’ side effects and the sophisticated
mixture of multiple threads and shared mutable state typically of concurrent O-O programs.
Incorporation of lock-based synchronization primitives, such as monitors, mutexes, and semaphores, in programs may
resolve latent defects (data races). Yet they lead to other harder to solve problems such as deadlocks, lock convoying
and priority inversion [14]. At a high level of abstraction, using locks lead to problems like inheritance anomaly,
loss of abstraction and code reusability, just to name a few. In general, these synchronization mechanisms complicate
reasoning about and maintenance of concurrent code and object validity.
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Exploiting the available concurrency is important to speed up programs [38]. But concurrent programming is challeng-
ing since it requires careful coordination between threads that access shared memory locations. Pessimistic lock-based
synchronization mechanisms, such as locks, semaphores and monitors, provide a means to synchronize memory and
coordinate threads, yet the solutions target performance in a cumbersome and error-prone manner. Lock-based syn-
chronization is difficult to reason about due to: the need to explicitly manage locks and the challenge of composing
lock-based code. It can lead to obvious defects (such as deadlocks and livelocks), and latent defects (such as race
conditions), due to the nondeterministic nature of concurrent programs. Adding more resources, such as faster CPU,
disk or network, and more memory, can make a seemingly stable system become unstable; latent defects show up
more quickly.
Software Transactional Memory (STM) systems [35] promise to ease programming concurrent applications by hiding
the complexity of concurrency control from programmers and enabling safe composition of scalable applications. STM
offers a programming model based from the ACID properties (e.g. Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation and Durability)
of database transactions widely used in software systems. Atomicity for code wrapped inside an atomic block ensures
the code is executed transactionally and if the transaction fails, its effects are discarded. Isolation guarantees that no
transaction can observe any partial effects of the others. Few STMs [13] pay attention to data invariants.
This paper presents our new programming language OV to allow developers to write more secure smart contracts
that can be statically checked and reasoned about. We also provide a new Solidity API that allows programmers to
incorporate validity contracts specifications into smart contracts written in Solidity.
6 Conclusion
Reasoning about the validity of the object states is challenging for concurrent smart contracts, which are to be deployed
on blockchains with trustless parties. Despite of being the most popular programming language for smart contracts,
Solidity still lacks a facility for specifying and verifying object validity.
To address these shortcomings, we have proposed an approach toward the next generation of smart contract platforms
that support optimistic execution of SC transactions. We have introduced a new Validity API written in Solity to
allow developers to specify object invariants and validity contracts in Solidity. We also have presented a new general
programming model and a new language, namely OV, to help developers to write more secure validity-based smart
contracts. The OV language is described with type systems and dynamic sematics. With validity contracts, validity-
based smart contracts are useful for reasoning about the validity of object states in optimistically executed smart
contracts and they can be statically checked. In addition, we have shown several possible optimizations for optimistic
execution of SC transactions.
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8 Appendix
This section gives some more examples of smart contracts, written in Solidity and OV.
8.1 Example: Token Contract in Solidity
pragma solidity >=0.4.22 <0.7.0;
library Balances {
function move(mapping(address => uint256)
storage balances, address from, address to, uint amount) internal {
require(balances[from] >= amount);
require(balances[to] + amount >= balances[to]);
balances[from] −= amount;
balances[to] += amount;
}
}
contract Token {
mapping(address => uint256) balances;
using Balances for ∗;
mapping(address => mapping (address => uint256)) allowed;
event Transfer(address from, address to, uint amount);
event Approval(address owner, address spender, uint amount);
function transfer (address to, uint amount) public returns (bool success) {
balances.move(msg.sender, to, amount);
emit Transfer(msg.sender, to, amount);
return true;
}
function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint amount) public returns (bool success) {
require(allowed[from][msg.sender] >= amount);
allowed[from][msg.sender] −= amount;
balances.move(from, to, amount);
emit Transfer(from, to , amount);
return true;
}
function approve(address spender, uint tokens) public returns (bool success) {
require(allowed[msg.sender][spender] == 0, ””);
allowed[msg.sender][spender] = tokens;
emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, tokens);
return true;
}
function balanceOf(address tokenOwner) public view returns (uint balance) {
return balances[tokenOwner];
}
}
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8.2 Example: Token Contract in OV
class Token[o] {
map<this> balances; // (address => uint256)
map allowed; // (address => mapping (address => uint256))
// inv : sum of all balances == N
event Transfer(address from, address to, uint amount);
event Approval(address owner, address spender, uint amount);
void move(address from, address to, uint amount) <this,this> {
require(balances[from] >= amount);
require(balances[to] + amount >= balances[to]);
balances[from] −= amount;
balances[to] += amount;
}
public bool transfer (address to, uint amount) <this,this>{
balances.move(msg.sender, to, amount);
emit Transfer(msg.sender, to, amount);
return true;
}
public bool transferFrom(address from, address to, uint amount) <this,this> {
require(allowed[from][msg.sender] >= amount);
allowed[from][msg.sender] −= amount;
balances.move(from, to, amount);
emit Transfer(from, to , amount);
return true;
}
public bool approve(address spender, uint tokens) <this,bot> {
require(allowed[msg.sender][spender] == 0, ””);
allowed[msg.sender][spender] = tokens;
emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, tokens);
return true;
}
public uint balanceOf(address tokenOwner) <this,bot> {
return balances[tokenOwner];
}
}
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8.3 Example: Purchase Contract in Solidity
pragma solidity ˆ0.4.22;
contract Purchase {
uint public value;
address public seller ;
address public buyer;
enum State { Created, Locked, Inactive }
State public state ;
// Ensure that ‘msg.value‘ is an even number.
// Division will truncate if it is an odd number.
// Check via multiplication that it wasn’t an odd number.
constructor() public payable {
seller = msg.sender;
value = msg.value / 2;
require((2 ∗ value) == msg.value, ”Value has to be even.”);
}
modifier condition(bool condition) {require( condition ); ;}
modifier onlyBuyer() {require(msg.sender == buyer,”Only buyer can call this. ” ); ;}
modifier onlySeller () {require(msg.sender == seller,”Only seller can call this . ” ); ;}
modifier inState(State state ) {require(state == state , ” Invalid state . ” ); ;}
event Aborted();
event PurchaseConfirmed();
event ItemReceived();
// / Abort the purchase and reclaim the ether.
// / Can only be called by the seller before
// / the contract is locked.
function abort() public onlySeller inState(State.Created) {
emit Aborted();
state = State. Inactive ;
seller . transfer (address(this).balance);
}
// / Confirm the purchase as buyer.
// / Transaction has to include ‘2 ∗ value‘ ether.
// / The ether will be locked until confirmReceived
// / is called.
function confirmPurchase() public inState(State.Created) condition(msg.value == (2 ∗ value)) payable {
emit PurchaseConfirmed();
buyer = msg.sender;
state = State.Locked;
}
// / Confirm that you (the buyer) received the item.
// / This will release the locked ether.
function confirmReceived() public onlyBuyer inState(State.Locked) {
emit ItemReceived();
// It is important to change the state first because
// otherwise, the contracts called using ‘send‘ below
// can call in again here.
state = State. Inactive ;
// NOTE: This actually allows both the buyer and the seller to
// block the refund − the withdraw pattern should be used.
buyer. transfer (value);
seller . transfer (address(this).balance);
}
}
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8.4 Example: Purchase Contract in OV
class Purchase[o] {
public uint value;
public address<this> seller;
public address<this> buyer;
enum State { Created, Locked, Inactive }
public State<this> state;
// Ensure that ‘msg.value‘ is an even number. Division will truncate if it is an odd number.
// Check via multiplication that it wasn’t an odd number.
public Purchase() {
seller = msg.sender;
value = msg.value / 2;
require((2 ∗ value) == msg.value, ”Value has to be even.”);
}
// modifier condition(bool condition) { require( condition ); ; }
// modifier onlyBuyer() { require( msg.sender == buyer, ”Only buyer can call this .”); ;}
// modifier onlySeller () { require(msg.sender == seller, ”Only seller can call this .”); ;}
// modifier inState(State state ) { require(state == state , ” Invalid state .”); ; }
event Aborted();
event PurchaseConfirmed();
event ItemReceived();
// / Abort the purchase and reclaim the ether. Can only be called by the seller before
// / the contract is locked.
// / Pre: onlySeller && inState(State.Created)
public void abort() <this, this> {
emit Aborted();
state = State. Inactive ;
seller . transfer (address(this).balance);
}
// / Confirm the purchase as buyer. Transaction has to include ‘2 ∗ value‘ ether.
// / The ether will be locked until confirmReceived is called.
// / Pre: inState(State.Created) && condition(msg.value == (2 ∗ value))
public void confirmPurchase() <this,this> {
emit PurchaseConfirmed();
buyer = msg.sender;
state = State.Locked;
}
// / Confirm that you (the buyer) received the item. This will release the locked ether.
// / Pre: onlyBuyer && inState(State.Locked)
public void confirmReceived() <this,this>{
emit ItemReceived();
// Change the state first because otherwise, the contracts called using ‘send‘ below
// can call in again here.
state = State. Inactive ;
// This actually allows both the buyer and the seller to
// block the refund − the withdraw pattern should be used.
buyer. transfer (value);
seller . transfer (address(this).balance);
}
}
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8.5 Example: Auction Contract in Solidity
pragma solidity >0.4.23 <0.5.0;
contract BlindAuction {
struct Bid {
bytes32 blindedBid;
uint deposit;
}
address public beneficiary;
uint public biddingEnd;
uint public revealEnd;
bool public ended;
mapping(address => Bid[]) public bids;
address public highestBidder;
uint public highestBid;
// Allowed withdrawals of previous bids
mapping(address => uint) pendingReturns;
event AuctionEnded(address winner, uint highestBid);
// / Modifiers are a convenient way to validate inputs to
// / functions. ‘onlyBefore‘ is applied to ‘bid ‘ below:
// / The new function body is the modifier ’s body where
// / ‘ ‘ is replaced by the old function body.
modifier onlyBefore(uint time) { require(now < time); ; }
modifier onlyAfter( uint time) { require(now > time); ; }
constructor( uint biddingTime, uint revealTime, address beneficiary) public {
beneficiary = beneficiary ;
biddingEnd = now + biddingTime;
revealEnd = biddingEnd + revealTime;
}
// / Place a blinded bid with ‘ blindedBid‘ = keccak256(value,
// / fake, secret).
// / The sent ether is only refunded if the bid is correctly
// / revealed in the revealing phase. The bid is valid if the
// / ether sent together with the bid is at least ”value” and
// / ”fake” is not true. Setting ”fake” to true and sending
// / not the exact amount are ways to hide the real bid but
// / still make the required deposit. The same address can
// / place multiple bids.
function bid(bytes32 blindedBid) public payable onlyBefore(biddingEnd) {
bids[msg.sender].push(Bid({
blindedBid: blindedBid,
deposit: msg.value
}));
}
// / Reveal your blinded bids. You will get a refund for all
// / correctly blinded invalid bids and for all bids except for
// / the totally highest.
function reveal( uint [] values, bool [] fake, bytes32[] secret)
public onlyAfter(biddingEnd) onlyBefore(revealEnd) {
uint length = bids[msg.sender].length;
require( values.length == length);
require( fake.length == length);
require( secret . length == length);
uint refund;
for ( uint i = 0; i < length; i++) {
Bid storage bid = bids[msg.sender][i ];
( uint value, bool fake, bytes32 secret) =
( values[ i ], fake[ i ], secret [ i ]);
if (bid.blindedBid != keccak256(value, fake, secret)) {
// Bid was not actually revealed.
// Do not refund deposit.
continue;
}
refund += bid.deposit;
if (! fake && bid.deposit >= value) {
if (placeBid(msg.sender, value))
refund −= value;
}
// Make it impossible for the sender to re−claim
// the same deposit.
bid.blindedBid = bytes32(0);
}
msg.sender.transfer(refund);
}
// This is an ” internal ” function which means that it
// can only be called from the contract itself (or from
// derived contracts).
function placeBid(address bidder, uint value) internal returns (bool success)
{
if (value <= highestBid) {
return false ;
}
if (highestBidder != 0) {
// Refund the previously highest bidder.
pendingReturns[highestBidder] += highestBid;
}
highestBid = value;
highestBidder = bidder;
return true;
}
// / Withdraw a bid that was overbid.
function withdraw() public {
uint amount = pendingReturns[msg.sender];
if (amount > 0) {
// It is important to set this to zero because the recipient
// can call this function again as part of the receiving call
// before ‘ transfer ‘ returns (see the remark above about
// conditions −> effects−> interaction).
pendingReturns[msg.sender] = 0;
msg.sender.transfer(amount);
}
}
// / End the auction and send the highest bid
// / to the beneficiary.
function auctionEnd() public onlyAfter(revealEnd) {
require (! ended);
emit AuctionEnded(highestBidder, highestBid);
ended = true;
beneficiary. transfer (highestBid);
}
}
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8.6 Example: Auction Contract in OV
class BlindAuction[o] {
class Bid[o] {
bytes32 blindedBid;
uint deposit ;
}
public address<this> beneficiary ;
public bool<this> ended;
public map<this> bids; // ( address => Bid[])
public address<this> highestBidder;
public uint<this> highestBid;
// Allowed withdrawals of previous bids
map<this> pendingReturns; // ( address => uint)
event AuctionEnded(address winner, uint highestBid );
BlindAuction( uint biddingTime,
uint revealTime , address beneficiary ) {
beneficiary = beneficiary ;
}
// / Place a blinded bid
public void bid(bytes32 blindedBid ) <this, this> {
bids [msg.sender ]. push(Bid({
blindedBid : blindedBid ,
deposit : msg.value
}));
}
// / Reveal your blinded bids
public void reveal ( uint [] values ,
bool [] fake , bytes32 [] secret ) <this, this> {
uint length = bids [msg.sender ]. length ;
require ( values . length == length );
require ( fake . length == length );
require ( secret . length == length );
uint refund ;
for ( uint i = 0; i < length; i++) {
Bid storage bid = bids [msg.sender][ i ];
( uint value , bool fake , bytes32 secret ) =
( values [ i ], fake [ i ], secret [ i ]);
if (bid . blindedBid != keccak256(value, fake , secret )) {
// Bid was not actually revealed .
// Do not refund deposit .
continue ;
}
refund += bid . deposit ;
if (! fake && bid.deposit >= value) {
if (placeBid(msg.sender, value ))
refund −= value;
}
// Make it impossible for the sender to re−claim
// the same deposit .
bid . blindedBid = bytes32 (0);
}
msg.sender. transfer (refund );
}
// place a bid
private bool placeBid(address bidder , uint value) <this, this> {
if (value <= highestBid) {
return false ;
}
if ( highestBidder != 0) {
// Refund the previously highest bidder .
pendingReturns[ highestBidder ] += highestBid ;
}
highestBid = value ;
highestBidder = bidder ;
return true ;
}
// / Withdraw a bid that was overbid .
public void withdraw() <this, this> {
uint amount = pendingReturns[msg.sender ];
if (amount> 0) {
// It is important to set this to zero because
// the recipient can call this function again
pendingReturns[msg.sender] = 0;
msg.sender. transfer (amount);
}
}
// / End the auction and send the highest bid
// / to the beneficiary .
public void auctionEnd() <this, this> {
require (! ended);
emit AuctionEnded(highestBidder, highestBid );
ended = true ;
beneficiary . transfer ( highestBid );
}
}
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8.7 Example: Ballot contract in Solidity
pragma solidity ˆ0.4.0;
// / @title Voting with delegation.
contract Ballot {
// This declares a new complex type which will
// be used for variables later .
// It will represent a single voter.
struct Voter {
uint weight; // weight is accumulated by delegation
bool voted; // if true, that person already voted
address delegate; // person delegated to
uint vote; // index of the voted proposal
}
// This is a type for a single proposal.
struct Proposal
{
bytes32 name; // short name (up to 32 bytes)
uint voteCount; // number of accumulated votes
}
address public chairperson;
// This declares a state variable that
// stores a ‘Voter‘ struct for each possible address.
mapping(address => Voter) public voters;
// A dynamically−sized array of ‘Proposal‘ structs .
Proposal[] public proposals;
// / Create a new ballot to choose one of ‘proposalNames‘.
function Ballot (bytes32[] proposalNames) {
chairperson = msg.sender;
voters[chairperson].weight = 1;
// For each of the provided proposal names,
// create a new proposal object and add it
// to the end of the array.
for ( uint i = 0; i < proposalNames.length; i++) {
// ‘Proposal({...})‘ creates a temporary
// Proposal object and ‘proposals.push (...)‘
// appends it to the end of ‘proposals‘.
proposals.push(Proposal({
name: proposalNames[i],
voteCount: 0
}));
}
}
// Give ‘voter ‘ the right to vote on this ballot .
// May only be called by ‘chairperson‘.
function giveRightToVote(address voter) {
if (msg.sender != chairperson || voters[voter ]. voted) {
// ‘ throw‘ terminates and reverts all changes to
// the state and to Ether balances. It is often
// a good idea to use this if functions are
// called incorrectly . But watch out, this
// will also consume all provided gas.
throw;
}
voters[voter ]. weight = 1;
}
// / Delegate your vote to the voter ‘ to ‘.
function delegate(address to) {
// assigns reference
Voter sender = voters[msg.sender];
if (sender.voted)
throw;
// Forward the delegation as long as
// ‘ to ‘ also delegated.
// In general, such loops are very dangerous,
// because if they run too long, they might
// need more gas than is available in a block.
// In this case, the delegation will not be executed,
// but in other situations , such loops might
// cause a contract to get ”stuck” completely.
while (
voters[ to ]. delegate != address(0) &&
voters[ to ]. delegate != msg.sender
) {
to = voters[ to ]. delegate;
}
// We found a loop in the delegation, not allowed.
if (to == msg.sender) {
throw;
}
// Since ‘sender‘ is a reference, this
// modifies ‘voters[msg.sender].voted‘
sender.voted = true;
sender.delegate = to;
Voter delegate = voters[ to ];
if (delegate.voted) {
// If the delegate already voted,
// directly add to the number of votes
proposals[delegate.vote].voteCount += sender.weight;
} else {
// If the delegate did not vote yet,
// add to her weight.
delegate.weight += sender.weight;
}
}
// / Give your vote ( including votes delegated to you)
// / to proposal ‘proposals[proposal].name‘.
function vote(uint proposal) {
Voter sender = voters[msg.sender];
if (sender.voted)
throw;
sender.voted = true;
sender.vote = proposal;
// If ‘proposal‘ is out of the range of the array,
// this will throw automatically and revert all
// changes.
proposals[proposal].voteCount += sender.weight;
}
// / @dev Computes the winning proposal taking all
// / previous votes into account.
function winningProposal() constant
returns ( uint winningProposal)
{
uint winningVoteCount = 0;
for ( uint p = 0; p < proposals.length; p++) {
if (proposals[p].voteCount> winningVoteCount) {
winningVoteCount = proposals[p].voteCount;
winningProposal = p;
}
}
}
// Calls winningProposal() function to get the index
// of the winner contained in the proposals array and then
// returns the name of the winner
function winnerName() constant
returns (bytes32 winnerName)
{
winnerName = proposals[winningProposal()].name;
}
}
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8.8 Example: Ballot contract in OV
// @title Voting with delegation .
class Ballot [o] {
// a single voter .
class Voter[oo] {
uint weight; // weight is accumulated by delegation
bool voted; // if true , that person already voted
address delegate ; // person delegated to
uint vote ; // index of the voted proposal
// inv : !voted || weight > 0
}
// This is a type for a single proposal .
class Proposal [oo] {
bytes32 name; // short name (up to 32 bytes )
uint voteCount; // number of accumulated votes
}
public address<this> chairperson;
public map<this> voters; // ( address => Voter)
public Proposal[]<this> proposals;
// / Create a new ballot to choose one of ‘proposalNames‘.
Ballot (bytes32 [] proposalNames)<this, this> {
chairperson = msg.sender;
voters [ chairperson ]. weight = 1;
for ( uint i = 0; i < proposalNames.length; i++) {
proposals .push(Proposal({
name: proposalNames[i ],
voteCount: 0
}));
}
}
// Give ‘ voter ‘ the right to vote on this ballot .
// May only be called by ‘ chairperson ‘.
void giveRightToVote( address voter ) <this,bot> {
if (msg.sender != chairperson || voters [ voter ]. voted) {
// ‘throw‘ terminates and reverts all changes to
// the state and to Ether balances .
throw;
}
voters [ voter ]. weight = 1;
}
// / Delegate your vote to the voter ‘ to ‘.
void delegate ( address to ) <this,bot> {
// assigns reference
Voter sender = voters [msg.sender ];
if (sender . voted)
throw;
// Forward the delegation as long as ‘ to ‘ also delegated .
while (
voters [ to ]. delegate != address (0) &&
voters [ to ]. delegate != msg.sender
) {
to = voters [ to ]. delegate ;
}
// We found a loop in the delegation , not allowed.
if ( to == msg.sender) {
throw;
}
// Since ‘sender‘ is a reference , this
// modifies ‘ voters [msg.sender ]. voted‘
sender . voted = true ;
sender . delegate = to ;
Voter delegate = voters [ to ];
if ( delegate . voted) {
// If the delegate already voted ,
// directly add to the number of votes
proposals [ delegate . vote ]. voteCount += sender .weight;
} else {
// If the delegate did not vote yet ,
// add to her weight.
delegate .weight += sender .weight;
}
}
// / Give your vote ( including votes delegated to you)
// / to proposal ‘ proposals [ proposal ]. name‘.
void vote( uint proposal ) <this, this> {
Voter sender = voters [msg.sender ];
if (sender .voted)
throw;
sender . voted = true ;
sender . vote = proposal ;
// If ‘ proposal ‘ is out of the range of the array ,
// this will throw automatically and revert all changes.
proposals [ proposal ]. voteCount += sender .weight;
}
// / Computes the winning proposal taking all previous votes into account .
uint winningProposal () <this,bot> {
uint winningProposal;
uint winningVoteCount = 0;
for ( uint p = 0; p < proposals. length ; p++) {
if ( proposals [p ]. voteCount > winningVoteCount) {
winningVoteCount = proposals [p ]. voteCount;
winningProposal = p;
}
}
return winningProposal;
}
// / returns the name of the winner
bytes32 winnerName() <this,bot> {
bytes32 winnerName = proposals[winningProposal ()]. name;
return winnerName
}
}
26
